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I. INTRODUCTION 
The experience of small farmer credit programs in Jamaica 
during the 1970 's illustrates many of the classic dilemmas faced 
by these programs in most LDCs. This paper discusses these 
experiences but, in so doing, the reader is reminded that the 
performance of the Jamaican small farmer credit institutions 
and programs are replicated in many other LDCs and the critiques 
and discussion that follow should not be thought only relevant 
to the Jamaican case. The paper is organized into four sections. 
First a brief overview is made of the performance of the economy 
during the seventies. Second, the relative scope and role of 
the small farmer credit initiatives in the larger rural finan-
cial market setting is established; third a specific analysis 
of the three major small farmer credit programs is offered and 
finally we conclude with a set llf recommendations to restructure 
and revitalize the rural financial murkets in Jamaica. Through-
out the paper attempts are made to distinquish between the issues 
of performance in the real economy. This issue is important 
since the factors and policies conditioning the performance of 
the economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular 
are crucial determinants of the performance of rural financial 
markets and programs. 
II. ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN THE 1970's 
During the late sixties and early seventies, the Jamaican 
economy registered respectable rates of growth (six percent for 
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real Gross Domestic Product) although this was not true of the 
agricultural sector which declined at an average annual rate of 
four percent. From 1973 onwards, however, a severe economic 
recession set in. Total real gross domestic product decreased 
by 2.8 percent per annum between 1973 and 1978, negative growth 
being recorded in each of the last five years. Key sectors 
such as mining, manufacturing, construction, and commerce de-
clined at average annual rates of three percent, seven percent, 
10 percent and eight percent, respectively. The agricultural 
sector was the only productive sector to experience positive 
growth (three percent per annum) over the same period. 
This dismal growth experience was associated with sharp 
contractions in domestic savings and investment. Domestic 
savings which averaged 17 percent of gross national product 
• 
in between 1965 and 1970, averaged only 10 percent between 1971 
and 1975, becoming negative thereafter. Though foreign invest-
ment helped to boost real national savings early in the decade, 
real net capital formation contracted almost continuously from 
J$250 million in 1970 to J$29 million in 1977. 
The growing deficit in the balance of payments has had a 
seriously debilitating effect on the economy. Net foreign re-
serves fell from J$130 million in 1974 to minus J$196 million 
in 1977 to place Jamaica on the verge of international bank-
ruptcy. A sharp, prolonged decline in export earnings combined 
with an inability to reduce imports sufficiently led to this 
' state of affairs. Domestic inflation also accelerated during 
' 
' 
' 
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this period, largely as a result of the growing public sector 
deficit and rising import prices. Annual inflation rates (using 
the Consumer Price Index as the measure) rose from 9 percent in 
1972 to 48 percent in 1978. 
"Stagflation" affected the financial sector. Government 
debt increased substantially as a proportion of commercial bank 
assets (from 11 percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 1977). Commercial 
banks increased their holdings of government securities because 
the decline in aggregate demand and credit ceilings reduced pri-
vate sector demand for bank credit, and because legal liquid 
assets reserve requirements were periodically increased. Interest 
rates, ranging between two percent and 12 percent on bank de-
posits, and seven percent and 12 percent on government securi-
ties during the past five years, did not keep pace with infla-
tion. Negative real rates of interest ranging between eight 
and 40 percent prevailed. 
borrowers. 
Consequently, savers have subsidized 
In summary, the Jamaican economy experienced a long eco-
nomic recession since 1972. ~xports declined, balance of pay-
ments deficits grew, and inflation rose to unaccustomed levels 
contributing to a negative real rate of interest situation in 
which savings have been penalized and borrowing subsidized. 
The agricultural sector, however, has been the one principal 
area experiencing some degree of positive growth although scarce 
and imported agricultural inputs raised costs to farmers during 
this period. 
' 
' 
' 
-4-
The extent to which substantial credit flows contributed 
to the favorable Jamaican agricultural performance is a matter 
of some controversy. The main thrust of this analysis is that 
fundamental weaknesses were evident in the design and opera-
tion of the public sector credit programs. These weaknesses 
along with the general economic disequilibrium undermined the 
effectiveness and viability of rural credit programs in Jamaica. 
III. THE NATIONAL RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET SCENE 
A. Growth 
There have been five major formal sources of agricultural 
credit in Jamaica throughout the 1970s: the commercial banks; 
the Agricultural Credit Board; the Jamaica Development Bank; 
the Self-Supporting Fdrmers Development Programme; and the Crop 
Lien Programme. Commercial banks are the largest single source 
of credit to the agricultural sector. This credit is largely 
short-term and goes to medium sized and larger farmers with 
good credit ratings and limited risks. In more recent years 
the commercial bank network has extended loans to large govern-
ment agricultural cooperatives such as the sugar cooperatives 
which bought out the former large sugar estates that had been 
in private hands. 
The remaining agricultural credit sources are public sector 
institutions or programs. The oldest of these public institu-
tions is the Agricultural Credit Board created in 1960. This 
institution has two portfolios: one serving larger farmers 
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through direct loans; the other aimed at small farmers and 
channeled through the national network of small people's coop-
erative banks. Loans in both cases are largely short-term 
and seasonal and, in the case of the people's cooperative 
banks, includes small loans as well. 
The Jamaica Development Bank began making large, medium 
to long-term "development" loans to essentially medium to 
large farmers from 1969 onwards. The Small Farmer Development 
Programme was also established in 1969. It makes medium to 
long-term loans to much smaller farmers than those serviced 
by the Jamaica Development Bank. Limitations on farm acreage, 
gross sales and assets have created a clientele for the SSFDP 
' that can best be characterized as medium sized farmers. 
Finally, there is the Crop Lien Programme created by the govern-
ment in 1977 and administered by the Ministry of Agriculture 
through their extension agents in co11junction with the people's 
cooperative banks which disburse these loans. Crop Lien loans 
are strictly small, short-term anJ seasonal, limited to domes-
tic foodstuff producers and focused on small farmers with 
little or no previous loan experience. 
Table 1 summarizes the growth of formal agricultural credit 
through these five major sources. Although loans outstanding in 
nominal terms grew almost seven-fold in eight years, this in-
crease was only two times in real terms, reflecting the inf la-
tionary erosion of the capital base for agricultural lending. 
' The large rise in loans outstanding between 1974 and 1975 
' 
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(Table 1) is partially due to a change in the Bank of Jamaica's 
classification of agricultural loans reported by commercial 
banks in 1975. Some kinds of loans which had previously been 
reported under distributed trades and other sectors were here-
after listed as agriculture. It is estimated that slightly less 
than half of the net increase in loans outstanding from 1974 
to 1975 were due to this change in classification (Graham, 
Bourne and Begashaw, 1978, Ch. IV). In 1978 there was prac-
tically no change in the amount of credit in nominal terms, and 
a pronounced contraction in real terms. 
B. Institutional Changes 
Table 2 permits an insight into the changing roles of the 
several institutions and programs comprising the agricultural 
credit supply network during the 1970s. The sources are clas-
sified into the farm size categories that most typically re-
flect the majority of their portfolio. From this profile it 
can be seen that large farmers benefited handsomely from the 
agricultural credit initiatives in Jamaica during the 1970s. 
Commercial banks and the Jamaica Development Bank increased 
their relative portfolio substantially until 1977 while, at the 
other end of the spectrum, the small farmer oriented Agricul-
tural Credit Board Peoples Cooperative Bank program lost ground 
markedly. In 1977 and 1978 there was an improvement in the 
credit status of small farmers. Two factors accounted for the 
' later shift: first, the Crop Lien Programme was established 
and people's cooperative bank credit expanded; second, commercial 
' 
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banks reduced their lending to agriculture. The Crop Lien 
Programme was the largest source of credit increase during that 
year, eclipsing the customarily dominant role of commercial 
banks within the total portfolio. No doubt the substantial 
erosion of the older small farmer credit line through the 
Agricultural Credit Board-PC network had caused sufficient 
concern and grievances that a new initiative and program was 
felt necessary to redress this imbalance. Unfortunately this 
initiative led to substantial problems of default. 
In addition to the large vs. small farmer profile depicted 
in Table 2, there is a foreign vs. domestic resource division 
that merits discussion. A large proportion of the loanable 
' resources of the Jamaica Development Bank and the Self-Supporting 
Farmers Development Programme come from foreign sources (i.e. 
' 
the World Bank and Caribbean Development Bank in the former 
case and the Inter-American Development Bank in the latter 
case). Domestic sources are almost exclusively geared to short-
term seasonal loans (through commercial banks, the Agricultural 
Credit Board and Crop Lien Programme) while foreign resources 
are earmarked for medium to long-term developmental loans (the 
Jamaica Development Bank and the Self-Supporting Farmers 
Development Programme). In 1970, the rural financial market 
expanded to include the new, internationally financed Jamaica 
Development Bank and the Self-Supporting Farmers Development 
Programme. Whereas in 1969 they played no role whatsoever, 
these institutions were the most rapidly growing sources of 
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funding for agricultural credit between 1974 and 1978. The role 
of international resources was crucial to the expansion of 
total credit supply during the 1970s, and more importantly, in-
dispensable towards lengthening the term structure to include 
developmental financing. However, growing problems of delin-
quency and declining foreign exchange earnings raise serious 
questions as to whether Jamaica will be able to secure new 
international financing for these activities or, for that 
matter, even service the current debt obligations incurred on 
past loans from the international agencies. 
C. Performance 
' It is useful to assess the performance of the system as a 
whole. Column 2 of Table 3 underlines the fact that total 
credit has been rising substantially as a percent of gross do-
mestic product since the early 1970s. This reflects the grow-
ing rate of inflationary financing in the economy through sub-
stantial increases in the money supply. Agricultural credit 
per se slightly declined as a proportion of total credit 
(panel A, col. 1). However, from 1975 to 1977, it has been 
growing more rapidly than total credit. (For reasons cited 
earlier on pages 5 and 6, the only unambiguous trends are those 
from 1970 to 1974 and from 1975 to 1977.) The agricultural 
credit/agricultural GDP ratio (col. 3) increased from 32 to 
roughly 37 percent in the earlier subperiod and from 56 to 
63 percent between 1975 and 1977. This rising average ratio 
of agricultural credit to agricultural gross domestic product 
' 
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implies an even higher marginal agricultural credit-agricultural 
GDP ratio. As a result of the credit slowdown (col. 1, Table 3), 
the average credit ratio decreased substantially in 1978. 
The ratio of agricultural credit to agricultural GDP has 
been rising in recent years because of the "deadwood syndrome." 
Many of the loans outstanding are deadwood, that is, in perma-
nent default on the one hand, and very likely permanently di-
verted to non-agricultural uses on the other hand. The high 
and rising credit/GDP ratio when combined with high and rising 
delinquency strongly suggest that farm loans are either not 
being applied to agricultural activities or, are being applied 
·inefficiently when compared to earlier years. Given the grow-
ing stagnation in the economy as a whole, it is possible that 
much of this credit may be leaking out of the economy as 
capital flight as well as into real estate, land and other in-
flationary hedges. This indiccites the need for a reform of the 
credit strategies adopted in recent years. 
The final issue warranting discussion in this section is 
the "implicit subsidy" built into the current credit programs. 
Panel B of Table 2 present estimates of the real rate of inter-
est for agricultural credit. The average interest rate charged 
for agricultural credit (from a low of three to seven percent 
in government programs to 13 to 14 percent in commercial banks) 
is clearly below the average rate of inflation (col. 2 vs. 
col. 1). The net result is a negative real rate of interest 
' (col. 3) which in recent years has been rising dramatically. 
' 
' 
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Furthermore, if one multiplies the real rate of interest times 
the agricultural credit/agricultural GDP ratio one can estimate 
the implicit credit subsidy as a percent of agricultural GDP. 
Column 5 shows that in 1978 this reached 9 percent, a high 
level by any standard. 
Thus, not only does credit appear to be increasingly used 
in an inappropriate (i.e. non-agricultural) or inefficient 
fashion, but also the beneficiaries or borrowers are enjoying 
a sizable subsidy. The social costs of this credit strategy 
could be substantial if, as indicated earlier, relatively 
large borrowers form an important part of the credit portfolio. 
This calls for a more detailed evaluation of the performance 
of the major institutions and programs comprising the national 
system of agricultural credit in Jamaica. The remainder of 
this paper, however, will concentrate on the small (and medium 
sized) farmer credit programs, their performance and their 
major problem areas. 
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' IV. SMALL FARMER CREDIT PROGRAMS IN JAMAICA: PERFORMANCE AND PROBLEMS 
Prior to discussing each small farmer program separately, 
it is helpful to clarify the degree to which these programs have 
penetrated the small farmer scene in Jamaica. Separate field 
studies by a UWI-OSU research team suggest that this spread is 
still limited in many areas of the island. Based on a large 
sample of farmers in Northern St. Catherine that statistically 
represented close to 3,000 farmers, only 22 percent of the sur-
veyed farmers had any form of formal credit in the last five 
years. In a comparable region in Southern St. Elizabeth repre-
senting a farm population of 1,000 farmers, only 18 percent 
' registered access to formal credit in the same period. These 
are predominantly small farmer regions and were chosen precisely 
to determine, among other thir1qs, the degree to which small 
farmer areas have been reached l>y formal credit. Between 75 
to 80 percent had never had access to formal loans in the last 
five years. The results show that this access is limited, even 
in the face of a large effort to reach these farmers with the 
Crop Lien Programme. 
Secondly, it is important to point out that many of these 
farmers, though excluded from the formal credit market, are 
still active in loaning and borrowing funds and in savings 
activity as well. In both these areas informal credit activity 
reached 65 percent of the total sample. Moreover, the total 
' 
dollar amount of informal loans was considerably larger than 
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the total dollar amount of formal loans through all the loan 
programs (and commercial banks) recorded in the area. Savings 
activity was also high with roughly 40 percent of the farmers 
in these two areas holding a formal savings instrument in the 
last year. Finally, off-farm employment was widespread among 
these small farm households with almost one-half of the farmers 
surveyed being active in part-time off-farm work. More than 
one-third of the farmers stated that off-farm income was more 
important than farm income in total family income. Moreover, 
it is interesting to note that roughly 85 percent of the 
farmers engaged in off-farm employment also were involved in 
either formal or, more importantly, informal credit activity. 
' 'I'hus, in summary, small farm households in the Jamaican setting, 
although not widely reached by formal credit programs, have 
alternative means of generating liquidity, namely informal 
sources from friends and neighbors and, to an important extent, 
off-farm income from th~ir off-farm employment. These informal 
and off-farm income sources diminish (and access to formal 
sources increase) as farm size increases. The foregoing illus-
trates the way in which small farmers live and function within 
a setting in which their access to more formal lines of credit 
is limited. Furthermore, it would appear that these sources of 
liquidity are sufficient to generate a respectable level of 
savings, given the large number of farmers who either hold sav-
inqs deposits or make loans to other farmers. With this as a 
' background it is useful now to review the three major efforts 
to provide small farmer credit on the island. In so doing, 
' 
' 
' 
-13-
attention will be limited to the more important issues and 
problem areas in designing and administering these programs 
rather than getting involved in any extensive detail on their 
historical background or organizational structure. 
The ACB-PC Bank Network 
The People's Cooperative Bank network (numbering some 115 
small branches scattered throughout the island) dates back to 
the early 20th Century. From 1960 onwards the Agricultural 
Credit Board (ACB) has been the principal source of government 
funds allocated to these small banks. The loans allocated 
through this network are generally small in size (from several 
hundred up to 2 to 3 thousand dollars), largely for seasonal 
production loans. Local bank committees along with the PC 
Bank manager and, on occasion, a loan officer from the ACB 
review loan applications which are then processed through the 
central office of the ACG in Kin<Jston. After review and approval 
in Kingston the loan funds are then 11ranteJ from the ACB re-
valving fund and allocated out to the branch in question for 
disbursement to the farmers. Loans are granted at 6 percent 
interest to farmers with the branches expected to repay the ACB 
at a rate of 3 percent, thus leaving a margin of 3 percent to 
cover lending costs at the branch level. 
Several important features stand out in this loan program 
• 
which can be summarized as follows: 
' 
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1. These institutions do not engage in any savings mobili-
zation activity except for the relatively inconsequen-
tial "share" contributions (i.e. 2 dollars) required 
from the farmer. No savings deposit function exists. 
Thus, these farmers deposit their savings in branches 
of commercial banks (from whom they do not receive 
loans) while receiving loans from the PC Banks. 
2. As a result of no. 1 above, the PC Banks are used as 
"retail" outlets for centrally generated funds. Given 
the vissicitudes of government funds and budget con-
straints these funds are not a constant flow but rather 
vary markedly creating uncertainty at the field level 
about the reliability of future funds. 
3. The PC Banks have frequently been used as the retail 
arm for disaster relief as well as for the more normal 
revolving funds. Disaster relief has frequently been 
structured as loans, though farmers invariably consider 
them grants, thus complicating loan recovery and, in 
part, injecting a grants mentality for the normal 
portfolio as well. 
4. Local accounting and bookkeeping procedures at the 
branch level are frequently rudimentary, confusing 
and/or non-existent in many important respects. 
Questionable practices at the branch level have in-
duced the ACB to intervene and manage some branches 
with their own management for varying periods of time. 
' 
' 
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5. Examples of deficient reporting can be seen in not hav-
ing arrears records based on amounts due. Instead, 
arrears are merely recorded in aggregate absolute dollar 
amounts at the central office but not associated with 
a time profile of arrears on amounts due. At the 
branch level such a measure could alert bank managers 
to the problem areas and problem farmers in their loan 
portfolios. Other data useful for reference and easy 
to record would be loans made by enterprise or crop-
type and by loan size. Unfortunately many PC Bank 
managers and their assistants are not sufficiently 
trained to engage in any systematic documentation of 
loan information that can be used to monitor loan 
performance or help in the analysis of loan problems. 
This, in turn makes it difficult for the central office 
to prepare up to date annual reports with detailed 
loan performance data. 
6. Loan recovery is a perennial problem in all the PC 
loan portfolios. High arrears rates are common repre-
senting close to 40 percent of the loans outstanding 
in 1978. No ratios or rates are available on the 
amounts due. Loan recovery is compromised by the dif-
ficulty and expense involved in enforcing contracts 
and prosecuting delinquent borrowers in the courts. 
While some of the more astute and determined PC Bank 
managers diligently pursue this effort for some of 
' 
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their most serious arrears cases, they frequently 
encount~r difficulties in collecting. 
7. The fixed interest rate of 6 percent on all loans is 
unrealistic and counter-productive in the face of 
rising inflation of 20 to 30 percent per year. The 
costs of administering loans rises with the general 
rise in prices yet loan recoveries are eroded through 
a decline in their real value. Farmers are enjoying 
a negative real rate of interest (i.e. a subsidy) 
while the PC Banks and the ACB are suffering from a 
growing cost squeeze which in turn demands further 
government subsidization. 
What emerges from this picture of the PC Bank network is a 
government subsidized loan program that would have little chance 
of survival if it had to depend on its own loan recoveries, 
particularly with the current low nominal rate of interest. 
This is an extensive network that the government has found 
convenient to use to disperse disaster funds in the past or to 
retail new funds such as the Crop Lien Programme. At no time 
was there ever a serious effort to prepare any of these insti-
tutions to mobilize savings locally and in part reverse the 
top-down centralized role of merely being a retail agent for 
government funds. 
In all fairness to the PC network and to some of the dili-
gent administrators in the ACB that try to manage the declining 
' revolving fund within tight budgets, many PC Banks are still 
l 
. ' 
' 
' 
' 
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generally well regarded in their communities. The loan committees 
are drawn from the local farm communities and, one can find cases 
where determined bank managers work tirelessly to protect their 
loan portfolios, lecturing the loan committees for more careful 
loan appraisals, badgering delinquent farmers to the point of 
prosecutions and carefully husbanding their loan recoveries by 
investing them in local savings deposits of commercial banks 
(rather than returning them to the Central ACB office). In do-
ing this they can have a local source of funds for relending 
without resorting to the uncertain ACB dispersals from Kingston. 
This latter tactic suggests that greater decentralization re-
warding local initiative and responsibility, combined with a 
local capacity for mobilizing savings and a more flexible in-
terest rate policy to cover lending costs might go a long way 
in helping some of the better managed PC Banks to mature into 
more complete and viable lending institutions that would be 
less dependent on outside subsidized support. 
The Self Supporting Farmers Development Programme (SSFDP) 
The SSFDP represented a major change in the approach to 
small to medium farmer credit delivery systems in Jamaica. 
This is your classic supervised credit program. Introduced 
through the ACB back in 1969 and then transferred to the Jamaican 
Development Bank (JOB) in 1974, the SSFDP gains its funds through 
low interest loans from the InterArnerican Development Bank (IDB). 
The Jamaican government contributes budgetary support to help 
' 
' 
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cover the high overhead costs associated with the technical 
assistance component of the program. Loan rates to farmers are 
at 7 percent while the IDB charges a 3 percent interest charge. 
Four features stand out in the design of this program: 
(1) medium to long-term investment loans geared to changing 
the production function (i.e. modernizing) on its clients farms; 
(2) a large technical assistance component is built into the 
loan to promote and then monitor this technical change; 
(3) thirteen regional off ices disbersed throughout the island 
act as the major points of loan monitoring and technical super-
vision; and (4) small to medium sized farmers from 5 to 25 
acres are the principal target group serviced by the program. 
These features stand out in contrast to the shorter term, 
seasonal loans that characterize the ACB-PC system. Also, the 
technical assistance component built into the loan contract was 
a new approach in the Jamaican small farmer setting. Whereas 
the ACB-PC Bank loan program generally serviced existing farm 
technology and practices, the SSf'DP was designed to introduce 
technical change and changed farm practices. As one would ex-
pect the average loan size was much larger in the SSFDP port-
folio than in the ACB-PC portfolio, ranging from roughly 4 to 
5,000 dollar loans up to 40 to 50,000 dollar loans. Finally, 
the average farm size was generally larger. Whereas, the ACB-PC 
system generally serviced farmers in the 3 to 10 acre range, 
the SSFDP was largely servicing a portfolio (in terms of the 
distribution of the value of its loan capital) from 10 to 25 acres. 
' 
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The operational performance, successes and remaining prob-
lem areas are summarized below. Again it should be emphasized 
that the problem areas identified here are characteristic of 
most supervised credit programs and not limited to the Jamaican 
program alone. 
1. Field studies strongly suggest that the SSFDP has been 
successful in promoting new production technology and 
new enterprise types on their clientele farms. At the 
same time there has been an apparent increase in output 
and net worth of the farms serviced. The foregoing 
would suggest that there has been only limited credit 
diversion to non-agricultural uses, a common problem 
in non-supervised credit programs. 
2. The SSFDP has the lowest arrears rates of all the public 
sector credit programs on the island probably reaching 
15 to 20 percent for the amounts due. Of this amount 
a large part may be associated with the earlier farm 
customers from 1969 to 1974 when disbursement was too 
rapid and the loan appraisal and loan monitoring re-
sponsibilities were not as effective as in the post-
1974 period. Still it should be pointed out that the 
program still does not structure its accounting pro-
cedures in such a way as to be able to determine easily 
arrears on amounts due. It would be in the interest 
of the program to do this, not only to detect potential 
problem clients earlier in the life of the loan (and 
.- :1-; ~ 
.. 
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' take corrective measures with the farmer) but also to 
clarify the degree to which the current aggregate 
arrears rates is primarily a result of the earlier 
non-JOB chosen farm clientele (as is commonly believed) 
and how much a result of the more recent farm clientele. 
3. With the exception of the above noted deficiency the 
data collection and accounting skills and efforts in 
the program are superior to those in other public 
sector programs. Information on the farmer is more 
extensively recorded and, one would assume, loan 
monitoring therefore more effective than in other pro-
' 
grams. The two areas in which improvement is called 
for is in the collection and presentation of the arrears 
data (as noted in no. 2 above) and a redesign of the 
bookkeeping procedures to first determine the true 
lendin~ costs incurred by the institution and, secondly, 
associate these costs with specific program functions 
(such as technical assistance; regional vs. central 
office activity, loan collection and recovery activity, 
etc •... ). If data could be collected and recorded in 
this fashion, officials could engage in a more analy-
tical study of the current and potential problem areas 
that need to be dealt with. 
4. The SSFDP illustrates the classic trade-off between 
' 
relatively low arrears and high supervisory costs and 
high arrears and low or no supervisory costs. The SSFDP 
program falls into the former category while the other 
. . 
' 
' 
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public sector credit programs on the island (whether 
servicing large or small farmers) fall into the latter 
category. 
5. Item 4 above raises the question as to whether the 
broader social or economic benefits of supervisory and 
especially technical assistance (increased farm output 
at lower cost) outweigh or justify the high administra-
tive costs of offering this supervisory role. First be-
cause the program cannot "internalize" these benefits 
(i.e. it is society at large that receives these bene-
fits of increased farm output at lower unit costs) does 
not mean they shouldn't incur the higher initial ad-
ministrative costs to generate these benefits. Crucial 
here is a more detailed evaluation of the technical 
assistance role throu~h independently contracted sur-
veys of the farm clientele to resolve essentially two 
issues: (1) the degree to which technical assistance 
is relatively all that important in generating the 
recorded increases in output and changes in farm prac-
tices; and (2) the degree to which the loan monitoring 
and loan recovery efforts are important in keeping down 
the arrears rates. 
6. Common to most supervised credit programs, the SSFDP 
is an incomplete financial institution in that it is 
entirely dependent on outside funding and has not en-
gaged in any savings mobilization activity. Given the 
> ,..1 
' 
7. 
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decline in outside funding and the increased uncertainty 
and variation of these sources, and, given the presumed 
success of the SSFDP farm clientele in increasing their 
income, a logical strategy to gain more self reliance 
and independent control of one's activities would be 
to broaden the mandate and role of the program to in-
clude the mobilization of savings from these farmers. 
This would lower the costs of receiving funds from out-
side, increase institutional viability and autonomy 
and draw the farmer into a closer and more complete 
identification with the institution. 
Consonant with any effort to make the SSFDP a more 
complete financial institution (as noted in item 6 
above) is the need to balance its asset or loan side 
with more short-term loans to service its farmer 
clientele. This would also allow it to offset and 
service the short-term savingB deposit function dis-
cussed above as well as meet the legitimate farm need 
for working capital to use in conjunction with implemen-
tation of its investment loan. 
8. The graduation syndrome is another important issue in 
supervised credit programs. To what extent should the 
SSFDP encourage its more established and secure cus-
tomers to leave their portfolio and try to "make it 
on their own" (i.e. through more loans from commercial 
banks while the program concentrates on incorporating 
... 
' .... 
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into their program new and riskier farmers who may need 
more supervisory help? The "turnover" or graduation of 
farmers out of the SSFDP portfolio has not been studied 
nor, I suspect, considered as an important function for 
the program. Given the time and effort invested in 
these more successful farmers, no institution will want 
to lose them since their overall performance record 
might suffer with higher arrears rates and a higher 
administrative cost load with the riskier and newer 
clientele. Finally to the extent that the SSFDP chooses 
to become a more complete and viable lending institution 
(as discussed in items 6 and 7 above) it would want to 
' keep these customers in its portfolio. 
9. Finally a more flexible interest rate policy is called 
for in this program as in the ACB-PC Bank program. 
Lending costs have increased with inflation which would 
suggest that a higher rate is called for to re-establish 
the previous spread or margin in former years. At the 
same time the purchasing power of the loan portfolio 
gained through loan recoveries will decline with in-
f lation if negative real rates of interest prevail for 
any period of time. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the SSFDP is concerned about gaining more autonomy, 
relying less on outside funding and possibly incorporat-
ing a savings mobilization role, realistic and flexible 
interest rates are necessary to protect the real value 
'. 
' .. 
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of its portfolio which would now be more dependent on 
successful loan recoveries. 
In summary, the role and performance of the SSFDP program 
illustrates many of the problems of public sector small farmer 
credit programs. In addition, its supervisory and technical 
assistance role creates a set of additional issues and potential 
problem areas that other public sector credit programs do not 
experience. The two most important issues noted above that need 
more informed discussion and analysis in the Jamaican setting 
are the degree to which the supervisory functions within the 
SSFDP are justified and, second, the degree to which this pro-
gram should transform itself into a more complete lending insti-
' tution in order to better prepare itself for a future with less 
' 
outside funding. 
The Crop Lien Programme 
The Crop Lien Programme, introduced in 1977, represents 
yet a third effort to create a small farmer credit delivery 
system in Jamaica, one that has turned out to be the most con-
troversial of the three. In contrast to the previous two pro-
grams, this effort was initiated and controlled in a non-
financial institution - the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
stated motive for this initiative was to service the short run 
seasonal credit needs of the Emergency Production Plan, a pro-
gram set up in 1977 to relieve the growing balance of payments 
constraint on the importation of foodstuffs. Thus the purpose 
.. 
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was to promote domestic foodstuff production of vegetables, 
legumes and root crops to replace the import of cereal products. 
The Ministry felt the existing credit programs were too large 
farmer oriented; not directed towards the import-substitution 
of domestic foodstuffs and not reaching a sufficiently large 
number of small farmers. 
In 1977 roughly 10 million dollars were allocated to this 
effort, the largest single source of credit for agriculture 
during that year. By 1978, under growing criticism and budget-
ory constraints this was cut in half. Succeeding allocation 
in 1979 and 1980 have been less than 5 million dollars. The 
operational design, performance and growing controversies sur-
rounding this program can be summarized as follows: 
1. The program did reach a relatively large number of 
farmers during its first year, roughly 27,000 with 
loans ranging from as low as 200 to a high of 4,000 
dollars. This mislead Ministry officials into be-
lieving that this was responsible for the large 
increase in domestic foodcrop output in 1977 and 1978. 
However, their own statistics show that many of these 
farmers had extremely small acreages harvested. The 
increase in food output was much more a function of 
the output of the much larger number of farmers and 
acreage in foodstuffs not in the program and, even 
more importantly, a result of two years of unusually 
good rainfall following the droughts of 1974-76. 
. . 
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2. Wholesale delinquency was the single most visible and 
controversial performance indicator of the program. 
Less than 5 percent of the farmers repaid their 
a seasonal production loans two years after its inception. 
3. Key operational features that led to the widespread 
delinquency were: 
a) far too rapid disbursement of funds 
b) perfunctory loan appraisals 
c) use of extension agents, who hitherto had never 
dealt with credit activity, to act as loan appraisers. 
d) no collection effort made with voluntary compliance 
expected. 
e) use of the ministry as loan source created image 
this was another subsidy program. 
f) no collatoral required 
g) farmers feeling that arrears would bring no 
effective sanctions. 
4. Farmers appear to be dissatisfied with this program 
and voice complaints about being forced to grow crops 
they otherwise would not have chosen to gain the first 
installment and their incurring fairly high transactions 
costs to attempt to gain second installments frequently 
without success. PC bank loans are invariably rated 
more favorably as a loan source by farmers surveyed 
in the Crop Lien portfolio. The PC bank loan program 
had a more established presence and role in the farmer 
' 
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communities, did not require specific crops to be 
grown, allowed a greater role for the farmer in 
influencing loan terms and issued their loans in time 
for effective use compared to the Crop Lien adminis-
tration. 
5. Several important negative externalties were incurred 
in the operation of the Crop Lien Program such as: 
a) compromising the performance of the PC banks 
portfolio since they were forced to retail the 
b) 
Crop Lien loans after the extension agents approval. 
This took PC staff away from the monitoring of their 
own loan portfolio and, at the same time, the 
"grants mentality" generated by the Crop Lien 
Program may have affected their own loan recoveries. 
extension agents were drawn off of their traditional 
functions to act as credit agents, a task they 
were ill-suited for, with a consequent morale 
problem emerging. 
c) the wholesale failure of loan recovery added to 
the government deficit exacerbating inflation and 
stabilization efforts. 
d) the recent transfer of the Crop Lien Program 
into the JDB may create greater problems for 
the SSFDP program to administer their own port-
folio while at the same time being forced to inherit 
a delinquency-ridden portfolio. 
' 
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The Crop Lien Program could stand as a testament as to 
how not to design a credit program. Unfortunately the potential 
for disaster was not foreseen in its initial design and adminis-
tration. It would appear that many of these lessons have still 
not been learned in that political pressure has persisted in 
an attempt to restructure and continue the program in some 
new format. 
The two greatest social costs incurred in persisting in this 
effort in a new guise is the potential damage this program could 
do to one of the more successfully run credit programs on 
the island (i.e. the SSFDP) and, secondly, the high opportunity 
cost incurred in not using the resources devoted to the Crop 
Lien effort to address directly many of the important bottle-
' necks and problem areas affecting the economic rate of return 
to agricultural activity in Jamaica. Activities that come to 
mind here are a better financed research effort, an up-graded 
' 
extension service and an improved marketing structure among others. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The performance history of the three small farmer credit 
programs illustrates the difficulties of attempting to reach the 
small farmer with formal lines of credit. Several lessons 
emerge from this experience. First, within the given constraints 
of risk, political interference, interest rate policy and limited 
organizational and administrative skills none of these programs 
are viable in the sense that they could maintain their current 
credit portfolios in real terms and cover their costs with 
their loan recovery record. They all have to be heavily sub-
sidized. 
;r---------
-29-
Second it is clear that loan appraisal procedures are 
rather perfunctory in two of the programs and very expensive 
in the third (i.e. SSFDP). At the same time loan monitoring 
and collection procedures are weak to non-existent in two 
and expensive in the third. Even if one accepts the premise 
that some element of subsidy is necessary and justified, it 
is clear that these programs should attempt to measure and 
consider the true lending costs they are incurring in trying 
to service these farmers. Only through an effort that 
quantifies and clarifies the relative proportion of these 
costs (as a percent of the loans issued) dS well as identifying 
the incidence of these costs by program or administrative 
function can the institutions or programs in question appre-
ciate the need for requiring a larger spread in their borrowing 
and lending rates of interest to protect themselves and/or 
economize on the more costly program elements. 
Third, high delinquency is one of the most costly elements 
affecting the viability of all three programs. Arrears measures 
based on amounts due rather than on credit outstanding is a 
crucial piece of information needed to prevent early-on the 
potential for the rapid deterioration of a program's portfolio. 
This argues for much more careful and intelligently designed 
data collection efforts than those typically associated with 
these programs. 
In addition to these more "micro-oriented" administrative 
reforms within programs, there are important "macro-oriented" 
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considerations that have been touched on in this review. 
Important here is the frequent but misleading idea that 
"supply-leading" credit programs can resolve the more deep 
seated real economic problems lowering the economic rate of 
return to agricultural activity. Throwing more credit into 
the farm sector will do little to resolve the problems of 
low or declining productivity or the risks associated with 
farming. The budgetary allocations used to subsidize credit 
operations could very likely have a higher social rate of 
return to society if they could be redirected (or a good 
portion thereof) towards improved research on better seed 
varieties; discovering more efficient farming systems for 
small farmers; more secure and less risky marketing infrastruc-
' ture, etc... The opportunity cost of short-changing these 
efforts in order to subsidize short-term credit needs (with all 
the credit diversions implicit here) is high. 
Furthermore, it is counterproductive to penalize agricul-
ture with overvalued exchange rates, subsidized food imports 
and price controls on foodstuffs and then attempt to offset 
this with subsidized credit. If the incentives are not in 
place to allow the farmer to use his credit productively, he 
will either experience a low rate of return and loan recovery, 
or he will divert this credit to non-agricultural uses. 
Two final elements of reform also require a change in the 
mind set typically operating in the credit field: a more flex-
ible interest rate policy and efforts at savings mobilization. 
'.: .. ,.. 
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(., In the face of persistently higher inflation, a more flexible 
interest rate policy is required to cover lending costs and 
prevent the enormous rise in subsidy to farmers associated 
with negative real rates of interest. There is no way a program 
can maintain the real value of its portfolio if interest rates 
are fixed while inflation rises. Finally a greater effort 
should be made to restructure interest rates (and engage 
in other incentives) to encourage the domestic mobilization 
of savings. Surveys have shown that many more small farmers 
hold savings instruments than have credit. A program that 
encou~ages savings mobilization could have a more favorable 
impact on income distribution than subsidized credit, and 
at the same time, allow these institutions greater self-reliance 
' and autonomy from government interference and dependence on 
uncertain foreign funding. This would require that these 
' 
institutions and programs would have to become more complete 
financial intermediaries (or at least some of them) and retool 
and train themselves for the future with a broader set of 
responsibilities than they have undertaken in the past. 
• 
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TABLE 1 
Total Loans Outstanding to Agriculture in Jamaica In 
Current and 1970 Dollars: 1970-1977 
Total Agricultural Loans Outstanding In Current Values 
And In 1970 Dollars (End of Year Balances) 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Current Values 
(J $000) 
(1) 
25,320 
30,557 
35,162 
49,005 
60,060 
112,743 
136,715 
165,821 
167,821 
In 1970 
Dollars 
(J $000) 
(2) 
25,320 
28,558 
32,141 
37,041 
34,817 
55,731 
61,088 
65,207 
51,605 
Sources: Statistical Diyest (Bank of Jamaica, various 
years; 
Monetary Statistics (Department of Statistics), 
various years; 
Annual Reports of the Jamaica Development Bank, 
Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program. 
Note: The Implicit GDP deflater was used to correct for 
inflation. 
• 
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TABLE 3 
Credit Ratios and Implicit Credit Subsidy For 
The Jamaican Agricultural Credit System in Recent Years 
A. Credit Ratios 
Year 
Agricultural Credit/ 
Total Credit 
Total Credit/ 
Total GDP 
Agricultural Credit/ 
Agricultural GDP 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Year 
7.8 
7.6 
6.4 
6.8 
6.5 
9.1 
8.9 
~.9 
7.8 
27.2 
30.8 
31.5 
41.2 
41.2 
46.7 
55.3 
61.1 
62.l 
32.3 
30.7 
33.0 
38.2 
36.9 
55.9 
60.l 
62.6 
53.2 
B. Estimat8~ of Real Rate of Interest for Agricultural 
Credit and Implicit Credit Subsidy As Percent Of 
Agricultural GDP 
Rate of Av<,J. i\lu1ninal Real Rate Agr.Credit/ Credit 
Inf lat ion Interest Rate of Interest Agr.GDP Subsidy as 
Agric.Loans (Col.2-Col.l) % of Afric. 
GDP(l 
1975 15.7 10.0 - 5.7 55.8 
1976 8.2 10.0 + 1. 8 60.1 
1977 14.0 1 (). 0 - 4.0 62.6 
1978 27.9 10.0 -17.9 53.2 
Suur..;e~.: Sta~is1::_ical _Dicjest (Bank of Jamuica), various years; 
National Income and Product (Department of Statistics), 
variuus y0<.trs. 
Nutt:s L:1r f'cu,1_.:l (': (1) SulJsjliy ....:s u ,Jt!L·cent of A<,Jric. GDP is 
<.;;::-;tint.J.ted :,.;y L.:.kill<_I the ,t:roportion of tc,tal 
out.;-;tu.ndiliq a,3ricul tural credit co tcitcl.l 
ac;ricultu.rctl CDP (cclumn 4) and multiplying 
tt1is by trw ncyative rate of interest 
(colurnn 3). For thi.s exercise, the 
al-'propr iatc rncasurt.-' of inflation is t11e 
implicit GDP deflater. 
3.2 
0 
2.5 
9.3 
.. ' 
•• 
' 
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